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The markets for repurchase agreements (repos) and securities lending (sec lending) are part of 
the collateralized U.S. dollar-denominated money markets. While smaller than other money 
market instruments, the markets for repos and sec lending are crucial for the trading of fixed 
income securities and equities.
3
The key question addressed in this paper is: 
 Repos are especially important for allowing arbitrage in the 
Treasury, agency, and agency mortgage-backed securities markets, thus enhancing price 
discovery and market liquidity. Securities lending markets play crucial roles for allowing 
shorting, both in fixed income and equity markets. Given the essential role of these markets to 
the functioning and efficiency of the financial system, it is important to better understand and 
monitor repo and sec lending. 
•  What are the data requirements necessary to monitor repo and sec lending markets, 
and so inform policymakers and researchers about firm-level and systemic risk?  
One of the conclusions emerging from the paper is the need to better understand the institutional 
arrangements in these markets. To that end, we find that existing data sources are incomplete. 
More comprehensive data collection is worthwhile to both deepen our understanding of 
the repo and sec lending markets and also monitor firm-level and systemic risk in these markets. 
Specifically, we argue that six shared characteristics of repo and sec lending trades need to be 
collected at the firm level: (a) principal amount; (b) interest rate (or lending fee for certain 
securities loan transactions); (c) collateral type; (d) haircut, (e), tenor; and, (f) counterparty.  
                                                 
1 This paper was prepared for the NBER Systemic Risk Measurement Initiative meeting on October 27, 
2010. http://www.nber.org/~confer/2010/SRf10/SRf10prg.html. The authors would like to thank Markus 
Brunnermeier, Michael Fleming, Ken Garbade, Frank Keane, Jamie McAndrews, and Arvind 
Krishnamurthy for their constructive comments on earlier versions of the paper. The views expressed in 
this paper represent those of the authors, and not necessarily the ones of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York or the Federal Reserve System. 
2 Corresponding author: Tobias.adrian@ny.frb.org, (212) 720-1717. 
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In addition to the above, we believe there would be value in collecting data at the firm level on 
the instruments in which securities lending cash collateral is invested. The reinvestment of cash 
collateral as practiced by securities lending agents potentially introduces a source of risk in 
addition to the run risk that also exists in repo markets. 
These data would create a complete picture of the repo and sec lending trades in the 
market, and so allow for a deeper understanding of the institutional arrangements in these 
markets, and for accurate measurement of firm-level risk. Further, these data would allow for 
measures of the interconnectedness of the repo and sec lending markets, which allow for better 
gauges of the systemic risk in these markets. The involvements of custodians, sec lending agents, 
and triparty repo banks are intrinsically tied to the riskiness of each transaction.  
 
Background on repurchase agreements and securities lending 
A repurchase agreement is the sale of securities coupled with an agreement to repurchase the 
securities, at a specified price, at a later date (see Duffie 1996 and Garbade 2006). Sec lending 
agreements are economically similar to repo agreements.
4
A repo or sec lending trade consists of six key variables: the size of the transaction, the 
interest rate, the type of eligible collateral, the haircut, the maturity date, and the counterparties.  
The haircut corresponds to the difference between the value of the cash and the value of the 
collateral, and is generally expressed as a percentage.  For example, if $100 of securities 
collateralizes a loan of $98, the haircut is 2%. The level of haircut will typically reflect the 
quality of the collateral but may also vary by counterparty reflecting collateral provider 
creditworthiness. The haircut can thus limit the counterparty credit risk exposure in secured 
borrowing transactions.  
 Both agreements resemble a 
collateralized loan, but their treatment under the U.S. bankruptcy law is more beneficial to cash 
lenders: in the event of bankruptcy, cash lenders can typically sell their collateral, rather than be 
subject to an automatic stay, as would be the case for a collateralized loan. 
                                                 
4 For a detail comparison of repo and sec lending agreements from a legal perspective see Ruchin (2011). 
In practice, repos are used more often to finance fixed income securities, while securities lending is used 
more often to obtain equities.  3 
 
Repo and sec lending trades are conducted in over-the-counter markets that intermediate 
between borrowers and lenders facilitating the exchange of securities and cash.
5
 
 Given that these 
are collateralized money markets, each transaction features a collateral provider and a cash 
lender. The motivation behind a specific repo or sec lending transaction can be either cash or 
security driven.  A cash-driven transaction is one where the collateral provider is seeking to 
borrow cash, while a security-driven transaction is one where the cash lender is seeking to 
borrow securities. Among the financial intermediaries that participate in repo and sec lending 
markets, two sets of institutions are crucial. First, clearing banks and custodial agents are 
primarily involved in the operations of the repo and sec lending markets. Second, security 
dealers are both lenders and borrowers due to their role as market makers. In contrast to the repo 
market, custodians play a unique role in sec lending transactions.  
Figure 1: U.S. Repo Markets 
 
 
Source: Copeland, Duffie, Martin, and McLaughlin (2011). 
 
                                                 
5 Sec lending agreements can accommodate the exchange of securities for securities. In the U.S., 
however, most sec lending transactions exchange securities and cash. In this article, we focus on this 
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A schematic of the US repo markets is provided in Figure 1. It illustrates the extensive 
intermediation role played by securities dealers. For example, securities dealers intermediate 
between financial institutions which are long in cash, such as money market mutual funds, 
corporate treasuries, and custodial agents, and those institutions which are short in cash, such as 
hedge funds and other dealers. Repo markets are also used to re-allocate securities both among 
securities dealers (e.g., the GCF repo market) and between securities dealers and hedge funds, 
asset managers and other financial institutions. The role of the clearing banks is hidden in Figure 
1--they provide the operational support for the tri-party repo market (see the next section for 
details on the tri-party repo market). 
Securities dealers also intermediate in the sec lending markets. In these markets, 
securities dealers are often borrowing securities from custodial agents and lending these same 
securities to hedge funds and other financial institutions. Part of the cash collateral that custodial 
agents acquire in the sec lending market is typically invested in the repo markets, creating an 
important link between the sec lending and repo markets. The custodial business is fairly 
concentrated, with a few large players dominating the market as suppliers of general collateral 
and specific securities. Consequently, custodial agents are also large cash lenders in the market 
for repos. 
While repo and securities loans may be open or term, most trades are open. An open loan 
has an overnight tenor, but continues until one of the counterparties decides to cancel it. In 
particular, if the borrower returns the securities, the lender must return the cash collateral. 
 
The U.S. repo markets 
Overview 
It is useful to separate two broad classes of repos, distinguished by the way they are settled: 
bilateral and tri-party. Bilateral repos are repurchase agreements between two institutions where 
settlement typically occurs on a “delivery versus payment” basis. More specifically, the transfer 
of the collateral to the cash lender occurs simultaneously with the transfer of the cash to the 
collateral provider. Hence, the cash lender must have back-office capabilities to receive, track, 
value, and account for the securities.
6
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 In a tri-party repo transaction, a third party provides a suite 5 
 
of collateral management and settlement services, such as settling the repos on its book, valuing 
the collateral, and making sure that the collateral adheres to the lender’s eligibility requirements. 
Because settlement occurs on the books of a third party to whom collateral management has been 
outsourced, the cash lender does not need the back-office capability to take possession of the 
collateral. Currently, the U.S. tri-party repo market is set-up to facilitate cash-driven repos. In 
contrast, bilateral repos are used both to obtain specific securities and cash.  In addition, the tri-
party repo market is currently exposed to intraday credit risk by the clearing banks, while the 
bilateral repo market does not have such exposures. 
 
The Bilateral Repo Market 
The bilateral repo market provides for the exchange of cash and securities directly between 
collateral and cash providers.  Use of this market may be preferable to other repo markets when 
two parties want to interact directly with each other, rather than through an agent or if specific 
collateral is desired. Dealers use bilateral repos to provide cash to hedge funds, real estate 
investment trusts, banks, and other institutions, primarily through their prime brokerage 
activities. The collateral dealers obtain in this fashion can in some cases be rehypothecated in 
other repo markets, notably the tri-party repo market, as described below. Bilateral repos are also 
common in the interdealer market, either as a source of funding or to obtain specific securities.
  Dealer often serves as the custodian for its prime brokerage clients. In such cases, they 
settle bilateral repos through which they provide cash to these clients on their books. Interdealer 
bilateral repos are typically settled on Fedwire securities or through FICC. One of the benefits of 
settling with FICC is that the settlement of a dealer’s repos, reverse repos, buy-sell transactions, 
and auction awards are netted (see Garbade and Ingber 2005). 
 
The Tri-party Repo Market 
In the US, the tri-party repo market is set up to facilitate cash-driven transactions and serves as a 
key source of funding for securities dealers. Hence, the main collateral providers in the tri-party 
repo market are securities dealers and, in particular, primary dealers. Some large hedge funds 
and other institutions with large portfolios of securities also borrow in the tri-party repo market, 
but they represent a small share of the total volume. 6 
 
The cash lenders are more numerous and diverse than collateral providers. There are over 
4,000 individual firms active as cash lenders. However, despite this large number, there is some 
concentration among cash lender types as money market mutual funds represent between a 
quarter and a third of the cash invested in the tri-party repo market and sec lenders represent an 
additional quarter of cash invested. Securities lenders use the tri-party repo market to re-invest 
some of the cash collateral received from lending securities. 
In the U.S., the role of the third party in the tri-party market is the tri-party agent, played 
by the two government securities clearing banks: JPMorgan Chase (JPMC) and the Bank of New 
York Mellon (BNYM). In addition to the responsibilities described above, current tri-party 
market practice results in the need for the clearing banks to finance the dealers’ securities during 
the day.  The intraday credit exposure results in high concentration risk of the clearing banks vis-
à-vis tri-party repo borrowers. 
Clearing banks “unwind” the tri-party repo trades each day. The unwind consists of 
sending cash back to the lenders’ cash accounts and the securities back to the collateral 
providers’ securities accounts, respectively, on the balance sheet of the clearing bank very early 
each day. This exchange results in the clearing banks extending intraday credit to the collateral 
providers, since the securities are no longer financed by the tri-party cash lenders. 
The unwind gives collateral providers access to their securities during the day without 
requiring the clearing banks to invest in systems that can track and substitute collateral that is 
allocated to a repo. Dealers need access to their securities for their business activities. Using the 
current infrastructure, it is operationally complicated to substitute collateral in the cash lender’s 
account at the clearing bank, especially for securities that are traded often such as Treasuries.  
 
The GCF Repo® Market  
The GCF repo® market is a blind-brokered interdealer market for Fedwire eligible securities 
where most interdealer repo transactions occur.
7
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 Fleming and Garbade (2003) provide an 
overview of the market. This market is part of the tri-party repo market, as it settles on the books 
of the clearing banks. FICC guarantees settlement as soon as it receives the data from the broker 
and compares the transaction. While FICC is not itself part of the tri-party repo market, it does 
settle on the books of the clearing banks.  
http://www.dtcc.com/products/fi/fixed_income_gsd/gcf_repo.php for further information. 7 
 
To participate, dealers must be netting members of FICC’s Government Securities 
Division (GSD).  The GCF Repo® service enables dealers to trade general collateral repos, 
based on rate, term, and underlying product, throughout the day without requiring intra-day, 
trade-for-trade settlement on a Delivery-versus-Payment (DVP) basis, which shifts settlement 
risk to the FICC netting members in aggregate.  
 
The U.S securities lending market  
Overview 
In U.S. equity markets, securities lending is primarily driven by the prohibition on “naked” short 
selling; that is a short sale by an institution that does not borrow the security to make delivery.
8
  In U.S. fixed income markets, securities lending is not only used for short selling, but 
also for other borrowing transactions such as security for security arrangements. An institution 
may also want to borrow a security for derivative hedges or to avoid “failing” on a delivery.  
Institutions also borrow securities to trade the repo rate itself, that is, if a Treasury security is 
trading special and a participant expects it to gain more specialness value, it will borrow that 
collateral for term and lend it overnight, hoping that the average overnight special repo rate is 
more attractive (lower) than the term special repo rate it pays to borrow the security for term.  
 
The ban on naked short selling creates a role for securities lending, which allows an institution 
that wants to sell a security short to borrow it.  
In the U.S., most securities lending is done against cash collateral. Typically, the lender 
of a security pays an interest rate to the borrower for the cash collateral. The scarcer the security 
is, the lower the interest rate paid by the securities lender. In addition to the return potentially 
generated through the lending transaction, lenders of securities seek to earn an additional return 
by investing the cash collateral. It should be noted that yield enhancement strategies embedded 
in the sec lending markets tend to be fundamentally different from plain repo transactions. In the 
sec lending markets, cash collateral is frequently invested in assets with characteristics that are 
very different from GC repo collateral, thus causing potential liquidity risk exposures.   
 
The main lenders of securities are beneficial asset holders, such as pension plans, mutual 
funds, hedge funds, or insurance companies. These institutions typically own the securities out-
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right and view sec lending as a way to enhance the yield of their security portfolio.  Because 
borrowing securities is mainly used for short selling, derivative hedging, or avoiding fails, the 
main borrowers are hedge funds, asset managers, option traders, and market makers.  
Custodian banks typically provide securities lending services (lending of securities as 
well as cash collateral reinvestment) to their clients, although some large beneficial asset holders 
may conduct these activities themselves.  There are also some non-custodian third party 
providers of these services. Prime brokers usually facilitate transactions for borrowers of 
securities. 
 
Crises in the repurchase and securities lending markets 
During the recent financial crisis, both the repo and sec lending markets experienced runs. In this 
section, we describe what is known about these runs, with the aim of highlighting what 
additional data is required to better understand them. 
U.S. repo markets 
  Both the bilateral and tri-party repo markets experienced runs, but of different natures. In 
a repo market, an increase in haircuts can force a borrower to de-lever because a smaller amount 
of cash is raised with the same amount of securities. Hence, a repo market can experience a run if 
haircuts for all collateral classes increase by a large amount.
9
A different kind of run can occur in a repo market if haircuts do not increase. An 
institution that relies on a repo market for its funding may be forced into bankruptcy if its 
creditors refuse to extend repo financing. This seems to be what happened to Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers in the tri-party repo market during the crisis, as lenders reacted to the 
creditworthiness of the counterparty as opposed to the quality of the collateral. 
 Similarly, an asset class can 
experience a run if the haircuts for that particular asset class increase. A run on one or several 
asset classes seems to be what happened on some bilateral repo markets during the crisis. 
  Our knowledge of the events in these markets come from recent empirical studies: 
Gorton and Metrick (forthcoming) analyze haircuts in the bilateral market, Copeland, Martin, 
and Walker (2010) and Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011) focus on the haircuts in the tri-
party repo market.  
                                                 
9 In addition Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Gorton (2010), and Ashcraft, Garleanu and Pedersen 
(2010) suggest that haircuts are state variables for aggregate economic activity. 9 
 
These studies suggest that haircuts in the bilateral and triparty markets behaved 
differently during the crisis. In the bilateral market, Gorton and Metrick show that haircuts 
increased rapidly, to high levels.
10 Hence, Gorton and Metrick argue that there was a generalized 
“run” on this repo market that reduced the amount of cash that could be raised by borrowers. 
Corroborating evidence for Gorton and Metrick’s hypothesis is the high number of hedge fund 
failures due to margin calls. On July 31, 2007, two hedge funds operated by Bear Stearns filed 
for bankruptcy protection. Both hedge funds were highly levered mortgage funds that were 
primarily funded in the repo markets. A closely related bankruptcy occurred on March 5, 2008, 
when Carlyle Capital Corporation failed to meet margin calls due to increases in repo haircuts. In 
the fall of 2008, many more hedge funds and shadow banks failed, as they were unable to meet 
margin calls. These instances are labeled “repo runs” by Gorton and Metrick, though one could 
alternatively view them as forced deleveraging.
11
In contrast, haircuts barely moved in the tri-party repo market, as documented in 
Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2010). The difference between the haircuts in the bilateral and 
tri-party repo markets increased during the fall of 2008, peaked sometime in the first half of 
2009, and came back close to their level of July 2008 by the beginning of 2010.  
 
This evidence suggests that there was not a generalized run on the tri-party repo market, 
although Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011) argue that there was a run on repo backed by 
non-agency MBS/ABS collateral. However, it appears that Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers 
did experience runs and the loss of funding in the tri-party repo market contributed to their 
difficulties. So in the case of the tri-party repo market, stress seemed to affect specific 
counterparties, rather than broad collateral classes, perhaps with the exception of non-agency 
MBS/ABS. 
Understanding the differences in the behavior between the bilateral and the tri-party repo 
markets is important. Rising haircuts, while problematic in their own right, can be viewed as an 
equilibrating phenomenon (Martin, Skeie, and von Thadden (2010)). Indeed, increasing haircuts 
reduce the amount of funding borrowers can obtain, but this does not shut them out of the market 
altogether. In addition, if the increase in margins is gradual, it may give time for institutions to 
                                                 
10 Different counterparties may have faced difference haircuts in this market, but data is not available. 
11 Adrian and Shin (2010a) show that there is generally a close connection between repos and leverage of 
broker dealers. The increase of haircuts in the bilateral market thus maps into the deleveraging of the 
broker dealer sector following the Lehman bankruptcy, and the concurrent decline of outstanding repos. 10 
 
adapt or find other sources of funding. In the tri-party repo market, the reduction in funding was 
precipitous, leaving little time for the firms to adapt.  
Another difference between bilateral and tri-party repo during this time was the creation 
of the primary dealer credit facility (PCDF) by the Federal Reserve following the Bear Stearns 
crisis of March 13, 2008 (see Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009). The PDCF was created to 
backstop the tri-party repo market and set of eligible collateral was broadened over time. The 
PDCF may have prevented some runs on securities dealers, although it could not prevent the 
trouble experienced by Lehman. While the PDCF is designed to provide liquidity, it cannot 
prevent credit events due to solvency problems. 
While the empirical studies discussed above present compelling evidence of the variety 
of behavior that occurs in repo markets, they also highlight the lack of comprehensive data. 
Gorton and Metrick (forthcoming) analyze data on one firm’s activities in one repo market, and 
Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2011) describe quantity and haircut data on the tri-party repo 
market. Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2011) have collected firm-level data on all six 
elements of the repo transactions, but, as explained in detail later in the paper, these data are 
limited by their scope and frequency. This lack of data hinders a deep understanding of the 
drivers behind the different run dynamics observed in repo markets. Furthermore, the lack of 
data makes it much more difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of policy actions, such as the 
PDCF. 
 
U.S. securities lending markets
12
Similar to repo markets, aspects of the securities lending market behaved differently during the 
recent crisis.  As broad deleveraging took place, the degrees of credit risk and liquidity 
transformation associated with the investment of cash collateral were key to understanding the 
degree of liquidity stress and associated losses a securities lender might face as it was forced to 
return cash collateral as its securities were returned. Excessive speculation in cash reinvestment 
created extreme asset liability mismatches, in what could have been an extremely boring and safe 
activity (invest only in Treasury GC repo). 
 
  The crisis surrounding AIG is an illustrative example. Like many other large insurance 
companies, AIG engaged in securities lending. Before the recent financial crisis, its loans were 
                                                 
12 Lipson, Sabel and Keane (1990a,b) provide a comprehensive overview of the securities lending market. 11 
 
mostly open and its pool of cash collateral was invested in particularly long-term and illiquid 
assets. This meant that it was performing considerable liquidity transformation, which can result 
in liquidity stress. This investment strategy yielded high returns before the crisis; however it 
contributed to AIG’s liquidity squeeze during the crisis.  AIG experienced something similar to a 
run as borrowers of its securities sought to return them, as part of the general market 
deleveraging that took place. The need to liquidate some illiquid assets to accommodate this 
return of securities contributed to a sizable share of AIG’s losses. Maiden Lane II LLC was 
created to alleviate capital and liquidity pressures on AIG associated with the securities lending 




The Economics of Collateralized Short Term Lending and Data Needs 
The runs described in the previous sections suggest that understanding the fragility of repo and 
securities lending markets requires a good understanding of the institutional arrangements under 
which these contracts are traded. This means that disaggregated data is particularly useful to 
understand market participants’ reactions under stress.  
  Liquidity transformation is one of the key functions of financial intermediation. In 
general, intermediaries tend to be funded with short term debt, and tend to hold longer term, 
relatively illiquid assets. This liquidity mismatch can give rise to fragility, as was pointed out in 
the seminal contribution by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, the inefficiencies arising in 
this simple setup can be solved with a variety of policies or financial innovations. More recently, 
a rapidly growing literature has been focusing on fragility that is arising due to rollover risk (see 
Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer (forthcoming); Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2010), and He and 
Xiong (forthcoming)).  
The key concerns related to repos and securities loans described in our examples are 
associated with the possibility of runs, which arise from liquidity transformation, and their 
potential spillover, which can occur when institutions are interconnected. This suggests that data 
about the degree of liquidity transformation being performed, notably the tenor of repos and 
securities loans is particularly important. The tenor of loans overlaid on the nature of cash 
management practices is of additional importance. Information about interconnectedness of 
market participants engaged in these markets would also be very valuable.  
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In addition to providing insights about the amount of maturity transformation, 
information about the tenor of an institution’s funding can serve as an early warning system. 
Difficulty in renewing long-term funding typically signals that an institution is under stress. 
Longer term funding gives the institution more time to find alternative sources of funding or take 
other measures to improve its odds of survival. A longer duration maturity profile also gives 
regulators more time to prepare for a potential rescue of the firm or an orderly unwind.  
Repos are an important part, but not the only source, of funding for dealers. Getting a 
better picture of the various sources of dealer funding, both the markets in which dealers fund 
themselves and their counterparties in these markets is important for our understanding of the 
sources of dealer fragility. For example, Duffie (2010) suggests three potential sources of “runs” 
on dealers: OTC derivative counterparties trying to reduce their exposure to dealers, loss of 
prime brokerage business, and run on secured financing, including repo. Disclosure of cash 
management holdings could mitigate the potential for creating hidden vulnerabilities in the sec 
lending markets.  
It is desirable to gauge the availability of different funding sources in times of stress, and 
to know the extent to which different funding source are substitutable. Understanding the 
differences in behavior between bilateral and tri-party repos contributes to that knowledge. In 
addition, understanding the interconnectedness between financial market participants can inform 
us about the possible propagation of stress through the financial system. 
Another potentially interesting source of data is the type of collateral being financed in 
repo markets. This information may provide some insights into the risk appetite of institutions 
funding dealers. Changes in the type of assets serving as collateral, or the introduction of new 
asset classes, can provide insights into the evolution of funding markets.  
In addition to this data, information about rates and haircuts would also be useful. In 
particular, information about interest rates and haircuts faced by a dealer could also be useful 
given the critical intermediating role they play. Given the differences in behavior observed in the 
tri-party repo market and in bilateral repo markets, interpreting that data could be difficult. 
Nevertheless, the data could help understand these markets better and also provide interesting 
cross-sectional information about different dealers. However, making cross-sectional data public 
could raise disclosure issues. 
 13 
 
Existing Data and Data Gaps  
Both repo and sec lending transactions can be fully characterized with six pieces of information: 
principal, interest rate, collateral, haircut, tenor, and counterparty. For regulatory purposes all six 
pieces of information are crucial in order to properly gauge systemic and firm-level risk. For 
example, in response to a rise in the perceived risk of a dealer seeking to finance its securities, 
cash lenders might ask for higher interest rates, higher quality collateral, increased haircuts, 
shorter maturities, or all of the above. Because they are heterogeneous, there is no standard 
response by cash lenders when faced with increased counterparty risk. As such, knowing a 
financial institution’s counterparties is essential to understanding that firm’s risk level. 
Furthermore, counterparty information would allow regulators and researchers to measure the 
interconnectedness of a repo or sec lending market. An important goal for regulators is to 
understand how difficulties arising in a firm will impact other firms in the market. This cannot be 
accomplished without information on counterparties. In addition, information about the cash 
reinvestment strategies of sec lending cash lenders are important ingredients to assess the 
riskiness of these transactions.  This is in contrast to GC repo transactions, where counterparty 
information is less relevant, due to the liquidity of the collateral. 
  There are a number of data sources which provide information on the 6 characteristics of 
repo and sec lending trades described above. Below we review what types of data on these 




There are a number of sources which provide average interest rate information on repo or sec 
lending transactions, conditional on the type of collateral offered and the tenor of the trade. 
Bloomberg, for example, provides daily averages of interest rates of repos by tenor and collateral 
type for general collateral repo trades. Data Explorer offers similar average interest rate data 
based on sec lending transactions.  
  These public data sources on interest rates are at the aggregate level and so do not 
provide insight on the interest rates paid by individual firms. But interest rates often reflect the 
perceived risk level of the financial institution borrowing the cash. As such, we argue that 14 
 
collecting interest rate data for repo and sec lending trades at the firm level is important to 
understanding the risks in these markets. 
  A source of firm-level interest rate data are SEC N-Q reports filed by publically traded 
money market mutual funds. These data are not reported in standardized form, but generally 
speaking these money market mutual funds report the total value of securities by type which they 
have accepted as collateral for repo transactions as well as information on haircuts, maturity, 
interest rates and counterparties. Hence, these data provide a fairly detailed snapshot of money 
market mutual fund repo activities.  Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2011) have started to 
collect and organize these data for the larger money market mutual funds, focusing on the years 
encompassing the recent financial crisis. These data are promising because they provide firm-
level information on all six characteristics of repo trades. Obtaining these data for all major repo 
and sec lending firms would provide enough information to accurately measure firm-level and 
systemic risk in repo and sec lending markets. Unfortunately, these money market mutual fund 
data are limited by their scope and frequency. Money market mutual funds are a large source of 
cash in US repo markets, but are far  from being a majority—for example, they account for one-
quarter to one-third of total cash invested in tri-party repo.  The snapshots of activity are also 
fairly infrequent, with new data on a money market mutual fund arriving semiannually. 
Furthermore, these snapshots may not be representative of their normal activity because these 
money funds may take into account that their repo transactions will be reported in their SEC 
reports (i.e., these data may suffer from the window-dressing problem).  
 
Principal and Collateral 
There are a number of data sources on the value of securities used in repo and sec lending 
transactions (i.e., the amount of collateral posted). Once again, Data Explorer offers a wealth of 
detailed information on the daily quantity of sec lending trades. As with interest rates, these data 
are only available at the market level, making it difficult to use these data to monitor individual 
firms.  
  There is additional data on the value of securities used in repo and sec lending 
transactions available from regular balance sheet filings with the SEC.  Every publicly traded 
company has to file quarterly 10-Q and annual 10-K reports. For financial institutions that 
participate in repo and sec lending transactions, the 10-K and 10-Q reports will report those 15 
 
transactions to the extent that they occur on the balance sheet.  While the 10-K and 10-Q reports 
contain balance sheet data at the consolidated holding company level, the SEC also collects 
balance sheet data on securities dealer subsidiaries. The Flow of Funds relies on these reports in 
aggregating broker-dealer balance sheet information.  
  In early 2010, the SEC required money market mutual funds to file N-MFP reports. 
Among other things, the data captured by this form contains information on the securities a 
money market mutual fund accepts as collateral for repo transactions. In particular, the name of 
the security’s issuer, maturity date of the security, the coupon or yield, and value of the security 
are reported. Unfortunately, information on the repo transaction, such as the counterparty, 
haircut, maturity of the repo, and interest rate of the repo transaction are not reported. The N-
MFP report collects its data in a standardized manner and the report is filed in an eXtensible 
Markup Language (XML) tagged data format. Consequently, going forward it will be fairly 
straightforward to collect data on, and analyze the collateral that money market mutual funds are 
accepting in their repo transactions. 
  The Federal Reserve form FR2004 assembles information on market activity from 
primary dealers.
14
  A relatively new source of information is provided by the Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure 
Reform Task Force.
 Primary dealers report the total value of securities purchased and sold through 
repo transactions by asset class. While the dealer-level data are confidential, aggregated 
information is made available to the public.  
15
  The above data essential provide snapshots of activity at the aggregate or firm-level. 
While interesting for some questions, these data are uni-dimensional.  
 The total value of securities by asset class which are posted as collateral in 
the tri-party repo market on the seventh business day of each month is reported for public 




                                                 
14 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/reportdetail.cfm?WhichFormId=FR_2004. For more 
information on primary dealers, see http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers.html. Adrian and 





Information on haircuts is limited. Beyond the aforementioned SEC data on money market 
mutual funds, there is aggregate data on haircuts in the tri-party repo market. Specifically, the 
Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform Task Force provides information on the distribution of 
haircuts. 
 
Tenor & Counterparty 
As far as we know, the only public source of information on tenor and counterparties is the 
aforementioned SEC N-Q report data filed by money market mutual funds. 
   
  In summary, there are a number of public data sources which provide information on the 
interest rates and values of securities used in repo and sec lending trades. Much less is known 
about haircuts, tenor, and counterparties and the exact nature of cash reinvestment strategies in 
these markets. Unfortunately, it is often difficult or impossible to piece together the information 
at the firm level. But we argue this is exactly the information needed to properly assess the risk 
level of a firm. While the overall amount of repo and sec lending trades of a firm is informative, 
the term structure of those trades is of first-order importance when assessing a firm’s risk level. 
Similarly, counterparty, interest rate, and haircut information all significantly impact a firm’s 
risk level. Consequently, it is important to collect this information at the firm level, in a 
comprehensive fashion. 
In addition to the above like data, insight into the use of securities cash collateral 
provides value.  As previously mentioned, in the U.S. market cash collateral is frequently 
provided against securities lending transactions and that cash is re-invested to earn an additional 
return.  Individual lenders determine the degree of re-investment risk they desire, therefore 
investments can be across a broad range of instruments of varying credit quality and tenor, so 
collection of data related to instrument type, credit rating (if applicable) and tenor can help 
identify the degree to which securities lending cash collateral is supporting other markets as well 
as the degree of associated risk. 
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Conclusion 
In a recent speech on the “Implications of the Financial Crisis for Economics”, Chairman 
Bernanke distinguished between Economic science, Economic engineering, and Economic 
management.
16
Our argument in this paper is consistent with the Chairman’s view and suggests that we 
need both better data and a better understanding of the institutional arrangements and the 
economic engineering in which key economic actors operate. The two go hand in hand. Good 
data helps to illuminate market functioning and can be useful to detect changes in market 
practices that could increase risk. A good understanding of institutional arrangements may be 
necessary to make sense of the patterns identified by the data and can suggest the need for new 
data as market infrastructure evolves.  
 Specifically, “Economic science concerns itself primarily with theoretical and 
empirical generalizations about the behavior of individuals, institutions, markets, and national 
economies. Most academic research falls in this category. Economic engineering is about the 
design and analysis of frameworks for achieving specific economic objectives. Examples of such 
frameworks are the risk-management systems of financial institutions and the financial 
regulatory systems of the United States and other countries. Economic management involves the 
operation of economic frameworks in real time--for example, in the private sector, the 
management of complex financial institutions or, in the public sector, the day-to-day supervision 
of those institutions.” He goes on to add that “With that taxonomy in hand, I would argue that the 
recent financial crisis was more a failure of economic engineering and economic management 
than of what I have called economic science.” 
Better data is particularly important for understanding repo and securities lending 
markets and monitoring developments that may be indicative of stress. Such early warning 
signals can be the basis for policy decisions that aim at stabilizing the financial system. These are 
the money markets at the heart of the market based financial system. While repo markets are 
primarily enhancing the efficiency of fixed income markets, securities lending markets play 
central roles for both fixed income and equity markets. Repo and securities lending markets are 
especially important for allowing arbitrage in the Treasury, agency, and agency MBS markets, 
thus enhancing price discovery, efficiency, and market liquidity. Securities lending markets play 
                                                 




crucial roles for allowing shorting of securities. However, both markets also perform liquidity 
transformation roles and are thus exposed to the drying up of liquidity. In the sec lending 
markets today, the degree of liquidity transformation is not reported in any transparent or 
systematic fashion, even when transactions involve large amounts of liquidity transformation.  
The repo market experienced such liquidity shortages in the week prior to the Bear Stearns crisis, 
and the securities lending portfolio in Maiden Lane II illustrates the risk in liquidity mismatches 
of securities lending. The differences in behavior between the tri-party and the bilateral repo 
market underscore this point. In the bilateral market, stress manifested itself in the form of a 
large and rapid increase in haircuts, creating a generalize run on the market. In the tri-party repo 
market, haircut barely moved but some firms’ experienced dramatic decrease in the amount of 
financing they obtained in this market. Hence, the structure of each market, and the nature of 
their participants, appears to have an impact on how stress manifested itself. Understanding these 
differences remains important. 
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